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Background Strategic planning is critical for successful pandemic management. This study 
aimed to identify and review the scope and analytic depth of situation analyses conducted to 
understand their utility, and capture the documented macro-level factors impacting pandemic 
management.  
Methods To synthesise this disparate body of literature, we adopted a two-step search and 
review process. A systematic search of the literature was conducted to identify all studies since 
2000, that have 1) employed a situation analysis; and 2) examined contextual factors 
influencing pandemic management. The included studies are analysed using a seven-domain 
systems approach from the discipline of strategic management.  
Results Nineteen studies were included in the final review ranging from single country (6) to 
regional, multi-country studies (13). Fourteen studies had a single disease focus, with 5 studies 
evaluating responses to one or more of COVID-19, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), 
Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), Influenza A (H1N1), Ebola virus disease, and Zika 
virus disease pandemics. Six studies examined a single domain from political, economic, 
sociological, technological, ecological or wider industry (PESTELI), 5 studies examined two to 
four domains, and 8 studies examined five or more domains. Methods employed were 
predominantly literature reviews. The recommendations focus predominantly on addressing 
inhibitors in the sociological and technological domains with few recommendations articulated 
in the political domain. Overall, the legislative domain is least represented.  
Conclusions Ex-post analysis using the seven-domain strategic management framework 
provides further opportunities for a planned systematic response to pandemics which remains 








The current SARS-CoV-2 (COVID-19) pandemic has brought into sharp focus the readiness and 
capacities of health and wider systems in the ability to respond and protect the public (1,2). 
Real-time situational analyses (3) are essential as the pandemic evolves, but this learning must 
build on what is already known from (albeit smaller scale) pandemics, and the role of important 
wider environmental factors which contributed to control or conversely were found to have 
delayed an adequate response. Assessment of the environment or situational analyses in health 
planning and emergency responses are fundamental for effective design and revision of 
national level policies and implementation of plans based on these. The scope and content of 
such analyses, of course, must include basic underlying demographic, epidemiological and 
health metrics of the population, but also factors on the ‘supply-side’ which should account for 
the wider infrastructure, including technological capabilities. In the case of infectious diseases, 
analyses must also include the prevailing social norms and cultural context, which may pose 
additional risks to spread, with an understanding informing which interventions are most 
appropriate for breaking the chain of transmission (4). During infectious disease outbreaks, 
advancements in surveillance, monitoring and modelling have enabled early warning systems 
and communications via the World Health Organisation (WHO), the Africa Centres for Disease 
Control and Prevention (Africa CDC), the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
(ECDC), the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and others. Together, they 
form the mechanisms for alerting the global community as outbreaks evolve to an epidemic or 
pandemic (5–7). But in addition to these ‘situation reports’ (i.e. what is happening in terms of 
the disease transmission and its impact), and ideally before the emergence of a pandemic, what 
do we know about the capacity of a given country to respond? And how do we assess the wider 
contextual influences which are particularly relevant in a pandemic scenario where advanced 
health systems and national economies are not enough to ensure successful containment (8,9)?  
Our recent work on what can be described as the ever-present pandemic threat of 
antimicrobial resistance, has suggested the PESTELI framework (10), which draws attention to 
the following environmental domains: Political factors, Economic influences, Sociological 
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trends, Technological innovations, Ecological factors, Legislative requirements and Industry 
analysis (11). These are more fully defined in Table 1. 
 
<Insert Table 1. Definition of PESTELI domains> 
 
Methods 
We conducted a literature review to identify 1) situation analyses in pandemic management, 
and 2) studies which examined contextual factors influencing pandemic management. In this 
study, we defined ‘pandemic’ as an infectious disease outbreak that has spread across multiple 
continents or worldwide, affecting a large population (12,13). 
 
Study eligibility  
Any study published in English from 01 January 2000 to 01 June 2020 that has 1) performed a 
situation analysis to assess the environment for pandemic management, or 2) examined macro-
level contextual determinants influencing pandemic management of one or more of the 
following pandemics: Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), Middle East Respiratory 
Syndrome (MERS), COVID-19, Influenza A (H1N1), Ebola virus disease, and Zika virus disease, 
were considered in this review, in any country(ies) setting(s). The PICO (Population, 
Intervention, Comparison and Outcomes) (14) and SPIDER (Sample, Phenomenon of interest, 
Design, Evaluation, Research type) inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied at the review 
stages (15). Studies focussing solely on other infectious diseases (e.g. tuberculosis, malaria, 
HIV/AIDS, cholera, dengue), non-communicable conditions (e.g. obesity, diabetes, Alzheimer’s 
disease, substance misuse), or local outbreaks (e.g. a Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus 
aureus outbreak in one hospital) were excluded.  
 
Search strategy and information sources 
The methods used in this review are in line with the PRISMA extension for scoping reviews 
(PRISMA-ScR) guidelines (16). The protocol is available from the authors upon request.  The 
PRISMA-ScR checklist was completed to guide study selection and data extraction. We 
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restricted the search period from January 2000 onwards to capture major pandemics. We 
limited the language to English. We searched PubMed, Ovid MEDLINE, Ovid EMBASE, Global 
Health, Health Management, and the Cochrane Library databases. Searches included both 
controlled vocabulary (pre-defined subheadings) (e.g. Pandemics) and text words (e.g. strategic 
analysis). The search strings used are provided in Supplementary Material 1. 
 
Study selection 
The title and abstract of the studies yielded from the database and reference list search were 
randomly assigned into two groups. Three researchers (NZ, RA, HK) participated in the title and 
abstract screening and in each group, by rotation, one pair independently reviewed each title 
and abstract and the third researcher resolved the disagreements in decisions (Group 1 - RA, 
Group 2 - HK). Two researchers (NZ, HK) independently reviewed the full-text articles which 
passed the title and abstract screening. All discrepancies were discussed and re-examined by 
the third reviewer (RA) until agreement was reached.  
 
Assessment of study quality and risks of bias 
We excluded those studies where a full article was not available (e.g. conference proceedings, 
meeting minutes). We excluded studies that did not include the sections in the preferred 
reporting items set out in the PRISMA-ScR checklist (16).  
Formal quality appraisal of the included individual studies was not performed, as this would be 
beyond the aim of this scoping review, which was to map key concepts, types of evidence, and 
gaps in research (17,18). Evaluation of intervention and policy effectiveness is not the aim of 
the current review (19,20).  
 
Data extraction and analysis  
Three researchers (NZ, HK, RA) carried out data extraction, with cross-validation for 50% of the 
studies using a standardised data extraction table (Microsoft Excel®). We anticipated 
descriptive results given the qualitative nature of the studies.  Key study characteristics, 
methods of data collection, situational analyses frameworks employed, and which of the 
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PESTELI domains had been examined (E), findings reported on (F) and recommendations made 
(R) were extracted (Table 2). Factors influencing pandemic management into facilitators and 
inhibitors against the 7 domains were synthesised (Table 3).  
 
Ethics approval 




A total of 176 studies were identified from the primary electronic databases. Two further 
studies were identified through a search of reference lists. After removal of duplicates and 
studies in diseases not of interest, a total of 144 records remained for screening. 45 studies 
were eligible for full text review and 26 studies were excluded with reasons, yielding 19 studies 
that met the inclusion criteria. Figure 1 summarizes the flow of literature search and screening.  
 
<Insert Figure 1. Study flow chart> 
 
Study characteristics 
Of the included studies, 6 were single country analyses (21–26), and 13 were regional level multi-
country studies (27,28,37–39,29–36). Fourteen studies had a single disease focus, with 3 studies 
on COVID-19 (21,22,25), 4 studies on Ebola virus disease (23,24,27,28), and 7 studies on Influenza 
A (26,29–34). Five studies evaluated responses to one or more of COVID-19, SARS, MERS, 
Influenza A (H1N1), Ebola virus disease, and Zika virus disease pandemics (35–39). 
No study included in this review explicitly set out to employ the PESTELI framework, but 3 studies 
employed alternative frameworks, including the SWOT (Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities, 
and Threat) framework (21), the PIP (Pandemic Influenza Preparedness) framework (29), and the 
SYSRA (Systemic Rapid Assessment) framework (31). The other 16 studies examined macro-level 
determinants affecting the response and ability to manage the pandemic, including workforce 
mobilisation and deployment; adherence of vaccination and antiviral therapy; public knowledge, 
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awareness, and perception; and compliance of non-pharmaceutical interventions. All studies 
were published after pandemic emergence. The timeline of the pandemics against the 
publication of the included studies (Figure 2), shows a notable gap for SARS and Zika.  
 
<Insert Figure 2. Pandemic and study publication timeline> 
 
Most of the studies employed one method of data collection: 9 reviews of the published 
academic literature (24,32–36,38–40) and 2 (25,26) used primary data through population survey 
surveys.   
Four studies (21,23,29,31) used  primary data via interviews or panel discussion with experts and 
stakeholders as well as secondary data collected through review of literature or other textual 
sources. 
Ten studies were results of work by researchers from a single country (21,22,24,25,30,32–
34,36,39). Nine studies were outcomes of international collaborations, where all corresponding 
authors of these international study groups were from high income countries bar 1 (23,26–
29,31,35,37,38). Two studies involved co-operation between research institutes and 
international agencies (i.e. WHO and UN) (23,29). Two studies had co-authors from national and 
local health authorities (21,23). One study bridged research institutes, national and local health 
authorities, and the private sector (37). 
 
Analysis using the PESTELI framework 
Though the PESTELI framework was not utilised, one study reported findings in each of the 
domains (29). Most studies (16) included analysis of the sociological domain. Notable gaps are 
evident in the legislative (14 studies), ecological (12 studies) and economic (11 studies) domain. 
While the political domain features in 11 studies (21,23,39,24,27–29,31,35–37) only five of these 
make recommendations in this domain. 
 
<Insert Table 2. Study design and PESTELI domains covered in individual studies> 
<Insert Table 3. Facilitators and inhibitors in pandemic management identified> 
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Political facilitators influencing the response included demonstration of political commitment 
(21,24,27), and strength in governance and stewardship (31). Inhibitors within the political 
domain emanated from lack of coordination between central and local governments and 
inadequate preparedness plans (21,36); discord about which experts and institutes should lead 
(23) and the extent of inclusivity of  stakeholders (35).  
Under economic factors, international aid and external funds were a facilitator (28,29) but over 
reliance on external funding was also reported as a barrier (31). Level of health system financing 
was an inhibitor (27,31) and facilitator depending on country context, particularly in regards to 
sustained community health worker investment and enhanced support during pandemics in the 
case of  Ebola in Uganda and Sierra Leone (35).  
Sociological facilitators were high media coverage and maintaining public attention (28); 
professional training of staff in healthcare and social care organisations (35); and social support 
to citizens in isolation (36). Conversely, the most frequently reported sociological inhibitors 
include lack of public knowledge and public health education in infectious disease prevention 
(24–26,31); stigma and discrimination against infected patients and healthcare professionals 
involved in direct patient care (23,24,33,39); cultural, traditional, and/or religious practices that 
may over-ride guidance and health protection messages (27,29,39). Perceived low risk of 
infection threat and the low value of infection preventive measures (32,34), and, diametrically 
opposite, anxiety and fear (24,30), also hindered progress. Lack of trust and confidence in 
authorities and abilities of the healthcare system to cope affected health-seeking behaviours 
(24,33). Recommendations were proposed in 9 studies to address these sociological inhibitors, 
and some repeated from the first of these studies in 2014 to the latest in 2020. 
Recommendations include transparent communication between government and citizens to 
share information that is up-to-date, easy to interpret, and relevant to contexts (e.g. tailored 
information for vulnerable groups) (23–26,30,33,35–37).   
Among the 7 studies, which included ecological analysis, 6 also analysed sociological factors 
(27,29,31,35,37,39). The findings suggested that the drastic change in human lifestyle exerted an 
impact on ecological and environmental profiles, which then influenced human behaviour further. 
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For instance, globalisation (S) and deforestation and climate change (E); dietary habits (S) and 
livestock production (E); population age distribution (S) and epidemiology profile (E); and 
international travel (S) and infection transmission (E). High vaccination coverage was the only 
ecological facilitator reported in 3 studies (29,31,35). Ecological inhibitors were centred around  
human behaviour; contact/proximity with wild animals; transmission of zoonotic diseases 
through livestock production, and high levels of international travel (27,29,37,38).  
Among the 11 studies which assessed factors in the technological domain 
(21,22,39,23,24,29,31,35–38), existing information technologies did facilitate progress (22,31), 
but delayed deployment and limited utilisation of such technologies remained an inhibitor 
resulting in weak surveillance capacity (21–23,29,35,36,39). In terms of the wider industry, 
internet coverage was cited as a facilitator (22) and inhibitor when coverage was low (37). 
Industry inhibitors were an inadequate supply of personal protective equipment (PPE) and other 
medical resources (23,27,28,35,36); and medical staff shortages (23,27,29,31). As expected, the 
interdependence between the technological and industry domains is highlighted. Technologies 
reliant on uninterrupted power and network coverage are obvious examples, but also more basic 
equipment and supply-and-distribution chains rely on the existing wider industry or the ability to 
quickly scale up and deploy emergency provisions. Recommendations, including, for example, 
accelerated mobilisation of research and development (R&D) through incentives, were proposed 
to mitigate inhibitors in both technological and industry domains to enhance preparedness for 
future pandemics (22), but the timescales for this varied.   
Overall, as noted above, the legislative domain was a gap in analyses and also was not explicitly 
assessed in the otherwise comprehensive assessment using the SYSRA framework of the 
Influenza A pandemic (31). Five studies reported legislative facilitators (21,24,27,29,37) including 
travel bans and border closures (21,24,27). The absence of legal frameworks for declaring an 
emergency and taking actions was cited as an inhibitor in the Eastern Mediterranean region (29).  
 
Discussion 
Our findings appear to show missed opportunities for capture and synthesis of learning, based 
on a comprehensive analysis within and across pandemics. Wider and more timely dissemination 
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of learning is needed. Large time delays between pandemic event and analysis are evident (see 
figure 2). There are recommendations that had been made, from the relatively sparse set of 
studies, but which now appear again in the current pandemic as inhibitors across the 7 domains. 
This slow knowledge mobilisation has contributed to the apparent lack of preparedness in many 
countries for the current COVID-19 pandemic (41,42). The vast range of outputs chosen for 
situational analyses could be interpreted as a signal that the endeavour is somehow seen as less 
scientific, or that the application of strategic management analyses in health has yet to mature. 
Public health journals have provided rapid turnaround on numerous opinion pieces which may 
have contributed to a disparate body of work lacking a common framework for synthesis. 
Additionally, this vacuum has left social media platforms as a fertile ground for debate on these 
macro-level influences (43). We encourage a more robust and comparable approach. Additionally, 
data sources used for analyses are largely confined to secondary sources with only 6 studies 
employing primary and secondary or mixed methods approaches, which means that findings do 
not benefit from multi-disciplinary inquiry and the necessary data triangulation. While the 
PESTELI framework is designed to help draw out the influences specific to each domain, the 
approach also highlights the interconnections and complexity between the domains. The idea of 
interconnectivity is certainly not a new one when looking at health systems strengthening (2,44). 
For example, inclusion of wider industry experts including project managers, data analysts, 
engineers, and experts in health systems and applied system methodologies must be coupled 
with the advocacy work and mobilisation of ‘thought leaders’ (2). We have recently been urged 
to use this crisis as an opportunity to equip and strengthen the system. The role of social care in 
this wider definition of health systems needs to be made more explicit. This review unveiled the 
missed opportunity in integrating community-based care and collaborating with social care 
organisations in the previous Ebola pandemic and in high income countries in particular, in the 
current COVID-19 pandemic. The sector was not only underprepared but also inadequately 
supported, a concern raised well before the COVID-19 pandemic (45).  
 
We acknowledge that limiting the study language has missed some national/local level studies 
but made this decision as the aim here was to look at potential for international learning. We 
 11 
encourage future analysis to include studies published in different languages and assess how the 
facilitators and inhibitors across the PESTELI domains might influence pandemic responses 
differently in world regions. 
While this review was confined to the lessons from emergent pandemics since 2000, previous 
pandemics, notably HIV, provide us with key lessons about the importance of protecting the most 
vulnerable groups and the impressive economic gains when a global health coordinated 
perspective is taken. We need to capture the lessons which enabled that novel threat to be not 
only contained but also integrated in the planning of robust, holistic health and social care 
provision, with the political, sociological and technological domains working over time. Further 
within- and cross-domain analysis may be strengthened using established assessment tools, for 
example, the governance TAPIC (Transparency, Accountability, Participation, Integrity, Capacity) 
framework (46), building on previous work and enhancing comparability. The traditional use of 
such analysis in management sciences is then to guide a force-field analysis where strategies are 
formulated to either weaken the inhibitors or strengthen the facilitators whilst also explicitly 
acknowledging which factors are immutable for the short or medium term. Where political or 
economic barriers are unlikely to change (as evident by the lack of recommendations in these 
domains), these constraints are still useful when projecting potential impacts of the programmes 
with a sociological or technological focus, for example. As we learn and adjust to this novel 
pandemic we need to prepare for the short, medium and long-term and the framework 
suggested here can help with the required 360-degree view.   
 
Conclusions  
Ex-post analysis using the seven-domain strategic management framework provides further 
opportunities for a planned systematic response to pandemics which remains critical as the 
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Table 1 Definition of PESTELI domains 
Domain Definition Examples 
Political (P) Political commitment, political leadership, political transparency 
National guidelines and policies, governance 
committee; accountability; corruption 
Economic (Econ) 
Wider economic influences which have a bearing on the health system or on 
individuals and organisations 
Funding sources and channels 
Sociological (S) 
Relevant trends according to age, gender, the way people live, work, norms 
and behaviours. Also include factors about how professionals in organisations 
behave 




New approaches to the surveillance, diagnosis or treatment of infections Surveillance, diagnosis, pathogen discovery 
Ecological (E) 
The epidemiology of other infections and trends in human health, animal 
health, agricultural factors, climate 
Pollution, agriculture and aquaculture, 
epidemiology of other diseases, vaccination 
Legislative (L) 
Mechanisms to support policy including the implementation of relevant 
legislation and effectiveness of this approach 
Administrative power of health and social 
care organisations, travel restriction 
Industry (I) 
Wider industry in addition to technologies, such as pharmaceutics, 
investments in the healthcare industry, pluralistic healthcare (government and 
private share) and role of healthcare insurers 
Workforce, medical resources, insurance, 





Table 2 Study design and PESTELI domains covered in individual studies 
Study  Study character Study design PESTELI domains 



















P Econ S T E L I 
COVID-19 
(21) 2020 Italy  •  • •  EFR   EFR  EF EF 
(22) 2020 China     • •    EFR   EFR 
(25) 2020 US   •      EFR     
Ebola virus disease 
(27) 2020 West Africa     • • EF EF EF  EFR EFR EF 
(23) 2016 Sierra Leone •     • F R EFR FR   FR 
(24) 2014 Nigeria    •   FR  EFR R  F  
(28) 2018 West Africa     • • EF  F F    EF 




 •   •  EFR EF F EFR F EF EF 
(30) 2014 Global    •     EFR     
(31) 2010 Asia •    • • EFR EF EF EF EF  EFR 
(26) 2018 US   •      EFR     
(32) 2016 Global    •     EF     
(33) 2014 Global    •     EFR     
(34) 2012 Global    •     EF     
Multiple pandemics 
(35) 2020 Global    •   EF F EFR FR F  EF 
(36) 2020 Global    •   EF F FR FR   FR 
(37) 2020 Global    • • • EFR  R EFR EFR R F 
(38) 2012 Global    •      EFR EFR  R 
(39) 2020 Global    •   EFR EF EF FR E   






Table 3 Facilitators and inhibitors in pandemic management identified 









Enactment of emergency 




technologies (e.g. big data for 
tracking and tracing; 5G 
network for telemedicine; 
artificial intelligence for 
rapid, precise diagnostics); 
regulation of travelling using 
QR code of health record 
(China) (22) 
 
Banned air traffic from China; 
mandatory reporting of travel 
history to the Italian National 
Health Service (SSN); 
mandatory quarantine (Italy) 
(21) 
Rapid response including 
increased healthcare human 
resources capacity and 
protected supply chains 
(Italy) (21); 
 
High internet coverage and 








Inconsistency between local 
and national guidance in 
technical orders and clinical 
protocols (Italy) (21) 
 
Lack of public knowledge 
resulted in continuation of 
mass gatherings (US) (25) 
Constraints in data 
integration and smart 
technologies to support 
contact tracing, surveillance, 
and other interventions 
(Italy) (21);  
 
Lack of rapid deployment of 
information systems; 
suboptimal information 
exchange across heath 
institutions; non-
standardised electronic 
health records to streamline 
emergency information 
(China) (22) 


























contributed to a 
rapid/effective response in 
some countries (e.g. Nigeria) 
(West Africa) (27) 
 
Declaration of national 
emergency (e.g. Nigeria); 
demonstration of political 
commitment (e.g. 
Presidential Summit attended 
by Minister of Health, State 
Governors and their 
Commissioners in Nigeria); 
national weekly briefings to 
provide up-to-date 
information, and dispel fears, 
rumours and misconceptions 
(Nigeria) (24) 
 
Deployment of foreign HCWs, 
as aids from allies, maintain 
global balance of political 
power; historical choices and 
policies facilitate 
institutionalised capacities 
and norms for civil 
emergency management, 
foreign medical aid, or 
overseas military personnel 
deployments (West Africa) 
(28) 
Countries with trading 
partners are more likely to 
act early to protect trade and 
prevent contagion; securing 
important inputs for 
domestic industries or output 
markets motivate HCW 
deployment abroad (West 
Africa) (28) 
Hand shaking discouraged by 
the federal government; 
HCWs and non-clinical staff in 
hospitals demanding full PPE 
before consulting any 
patient; high public 
awareness and interest; trust 
and confidence in public 
authorities enhancing 




Media coverage and public 
attention facilitate 
humanitarian assistance and 
HCW deployment (West 
Africa) (28) 
  
Temporary border closure 











Political interference (e.g. 
contact tracer recruitment 
and organisation led by non-
health institutes) (Sierra 
Leone) (23) 
 
Contests between powerful 
domestic actors delaying 
crisis response; 
organisational limitations, 
cognitive barriers and 
political construction of 
threat perception in policy 
makers may lead to 
hesitation in HCW 
deployment (West Africa) 
(28) 
Poor healthcare system 
financing (West Africa) (27) 
Inadequate self-prescribed 
infection preventative 
measures due to poor health 
education; poor housing 
conditions in rural areas; 
poor safety orientation 
(training) in hospitals; low 
adherence to government 
regulations in rural areas 
despite public campaigns; re-
infection due to risky sexual 
behaviours; lack of follow-up 
with recovered cases and 
long-term monitoring; culture 
and tradition (e.g. mass 
gathering at funerals) (West 
Africa) (27) 
 
Rejecting contact tracing due 
to stigma and fear, and/or to 
avoid quarantine; inadequate 
training of contact tracers; 
lack of support to 
quarantined citizens (Sierra 
Leone) (23) 
 
Stigma and discrimination 
against patients and HCWs 
who treated them and 
subsequent actions (e.g. 
protests near treatment 
centres due to lack of 
knowledge, fear, and 
misinformation on mass 
media (e.g. Ebola infection is 
incurable); low willingness 
among HCWs to join the front 
line due to fear; low 
confidence in the capacity of 
health system and leadership 
to provide reliable 
information and resources for 
infection prevention (Nigeria) 
(24) 
Incomplete case monitoring 
database (Sierra Leone) (23) 
High prevalence of 
nosocomial infections; 
climate conditions increasing 
transmission; deforestation; 
physical proximity between 
human and wildlife, including 
animal reservoirs (e.g. fruit 
bats); zoonotic pathogens 
transmitting across species; 
low vaccination due to 
misinformation in mass 
media (West Africa) (27) 
Cross-border transmission 
due to relaxed immigration 
policies (West Africa) (27) 
Inadequate drug and PPE 
supply; staffing limitation due 
to transmission among HCWs 
(West Africa) (27) 
 
Lack of appropriate 
equipment for contact 
tracers; heavy workload due 
to shortage of contact tracers 
(Sierra Leone) (23) 
 
Deployment of HCWs can be 
delayed if industry 
interdependence exists, such 
as logistical planning, medical 
evacuation, and other 



















Arrangement and strength in 
governance and stewardship 
(Asia) (31) 
External funds through the 
Partnership Contribution (PC) 
of Pandemic Influenza 
Preparedness (PIP) (Eastern 
Mediterranean) (29) 
Public knowledge (e.g. 
knowledge in transmission 
mechanism, infection control 
measures; efficacy and 
effectiveness of control 
measures); optimal 
perception of severity and 
vulnerability of the infection 
(Global) (30) 
 
Optimal knowledge in the 
influenza pandemic; having a 
health-related personal 
network (e.g. having family or 
friends who can provide 
health-related information or 
support) (US) (26) 
 
Adherence with antiviral 
medication (either as 
prophylaxis or treatment) 
associated with previous 
compliance with other 
precautionary advice about 
pandemic flu, beliefs that the 
recommended preventive 
measures were necessary; 
having discussed the option 
of taking antiviral medication 
with someone who had not 
experienced side effects 
(Global) (32) 
 
Perception of benefits of 
vaccination (e.g. protecting 
themselves and loved ones, 
protecting patients); 
adequate perception of 
susceptibility (e.g. risk of 
infection, immunity via 
previous exposure) and 
severity; responsive action to 
information from mass 




Technologies available for 
surveillance, case detection, 
and infection control (Asia) 
(31) 
Vaccination coverage; early 
initiation of antivirals 
(Eastern Mediterranean) (29) 
 
Existing epidemiological 
profile of high life expectancy 
and low mortality (Asia) (31) 
 
External resources available 
for LMICS (e.g. Laos, 








 Inadequate preparedness 
plans lacking detailed 
strategic review and 
assessment (Eastern 
Mediterranean) (29) 
Insufficient budget for 
pandemic preparedness; 
reliance on external funding 
(Asia) (31) 
The annual Islamic pilgrimage 
(Hajj) driving transmission; 
population displacement and 
migration due to ongoing 
wars and conflicts (Eastern 
Mediterranean) (29) 
 
Anxiety and fear (Global) (30) 
 
Lack of public health 
education specifically for 
Influenza A (instead focusing 
on Avian influenza) (Asia) (31) 
 
Low education; 
unemployment and low 
socio-economic position 
associated with inadequate 
access to health information 
(US) (26) 
 
Non-adherence with antiviral 
medication due to 
experienced or perceived 
adverse effects, not wanting 
to take medication, 
forgetting, losing, or running 
out of tablets (Global) (32) 
 
Social stigma and 
discrimination against one or 
more particular social sub-
group (s); lack of trust in 
government’s capacity and 
fairness when handling the 
emergence; inequalities in 
exposure to public health 
communication messages 
which led to negative 
outcomes including low 
vaccine uptake; inadequate 
knowledge, attitude, and 
beliefs about the pandemic; 
suboptimal care seeking 
behaviour; low ability and 
willingness to seek and 
process information; poor 
emotional responses (Global) 
(33) 
 
Vaccine hesitancy among 
HCWs due to concerns in 




Lack of complete surveillance 
systems across national, sub-
national and regional level; 
absence of integration 
between animal and human 
surveillance networks 
(Eastern Mediterranean) (29);  
Global migratory bird flight 
increasing transmission of 
Avian influenza through wild 
birds, poultry and humans 
(Eastern Mediterranean) (29) 
Absence of legal framework 
(for declaring emergency and 
taking actions) in pandemic 
planning (Eastern 
Mediterranean) (29) 
Shortage in trained staff and 
laboratory equipment for 
surveillance; lack of planning 
for procurement, storage and 
distribution of vaccines; low 
utilisation of research and 
evaluation to revise 
preparedness plans and 
improve prevention and 
containment measures 
(Eastern Mediterranean) (29) 
 
Shortage of qualified human 
resources restricting 
surveillance and response 












Policies to define Community 
Health Worker (CHW) tasks 
and roles; stakeholder 
engagement in governance 
arrangements (Global) (35) 
 
Collaboration between 
governmental agencies and 
external organisations (e.g. 
the CDC and WHO) (Global) 
(37) 
 
Credibility of evidence 
informing responses; 
healthcare system capacity 
(Global) (39) 
Sustained investment in 
CHWs (e.g. financial 
incentives remote area 
allowance, performance-
based financing payments or 
accommodation); additional 
resources to support the 
wellbeing of CHWs during 
and post pandemic (Global) 
(35) 
Appropriate CHW training; 
organised and funded 
wellbeing support to CHWs; 
community engagement to 
enhance social mobilisation, 




fears (Global) (35) 
 
Community palliative care to 
support people who prefer to 
remain at home towards end 
of life; re-deployment of 
volunteers to provide 
psychosocial and 
bereavement care; support 
carers to deal with stress;  
communication and leader 
identification in environment 
with multiple caregivers, 
especially in low resource 




systems and digital health 
technology employed for 
CHW programmes (Global) 
(35) 
 
Volunteers transitioned to 





technology to predict 
pandemic potential in novel 
microbes (Global) (38) 
Improved vaccination 
coverage with as an outcome 
of CHWs’ regular household 
visits, liaising with poultry 
and feed sellers at 
marketplace (Global) (35) 
 
Adequate PPE supply to 








Lack of a prior pandemic 
communication plan (Global) 
(35) 
 
Delayed, poor coordination 
of hospital level policies and 
protocols and hospice-
specific guidance (Global) 
(36) 
 
Confusion in attribution of 
responsibility (e.g. healthcare 
system or the general public); 
lack of coordination in 
responses among agencies 
due to competing causal 
explanations of the pandemic 
and conflicts in priorities 
(Global) (39) 
Ethical challenges concerning 
allocation of scare resources 
(Global) (36) 
 
Economic inequalities in 
social sub-group(s) (Global) 
(39) 
Globalisation accelerating 
transmission; culture (e.g. 
traditional burial practices, 
dietary habits such as 
consumption of bush meat, 
blaming and social stigma) 
(Global) (39) 
Non-functional surveillance 
systems due to delayed 
reporting from health 
facilities; contact tracing 
potentially hamper primary 
service delivery (Global) (35) 
 
Lack of data collection 
systems to understand 
patient outcomes and share 
learnings (Global) (36) 
 
Low adoption of remote 
medical assistance to detect 
and control zoonotic 
infectious disease outbreaks 
(Global) (37) 
 
Inadequate case reporting 
due to lack of information 
technologies (Global) (39) 
Fast transmission due to 
environmental change and 
international travel via rail 
and air  (Global) (37) 
 
Juxtaposition of livestock 
production and wildlife 
populations; change in land 
use related to development 
and deforestation (Global) 
(38) 
 
Disruption in drug and 
equipment supplies common 
during pandemics; lack of 
research in equity, gender 
equality, and economic 
evaluation of CHW 
programmes (Global) (35)  
 
Lack of material supplies (e.g. 




Lack of integration of internet 
and related technologies for 
surveillance activities (e.g. 
simultaneous reporting and 
monitoring, end-to-end 
connectivity, data assortment 
and analysis, tracking and 
alerts) (Global) (37) 
(35): Lassa, Ebola, Influenza (H1N1, H5N1); (36): Ebola, SARS, COVID-19, Influenza (H1N1); (37): SARS, MERS, COVID-19; (38): HIV/AIDS, SARS, Influenza (H1N1); (39): SARS, Zika, Ebola 
 
 
